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INTRODUCTION
At the height of the Cold War, the Home Blast Shelter served as a
domestic line of defense against the unthinkable. As part of a civil
defense plan to protect the public from the effects of a nuclear attack,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency issued more than thirty
million copies of do-it-yourself Home Blast Shelter plans.1 With the
world's two superpowers poised to unleash deadly arsenals on each
other, the plans touted that such backyard shelters could "provide
protection against thermal effects, fallout radiation, and blast effects
from a nuclear weapon." 2 Faced with the prospect, however small, of
a cataclysmic showdown, it was basic human instinct to seek some
means of survival.
Blast shelters find their regulatory parallel in the vast expansion
of the rules governing lawyers that the Securities and Exchange Coin-
t Karl A. Groskaufmanis is a partner at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson,
resident in Washington, D.C. The author thanks Danielle McCoy for her contributions to
this Article.
I Whistling Through the Holocaust, ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 1982, at 24.
2 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, HOME BLAST SHELTER: UNDERGROUND CON-
CRETE SHELTER, Publication H-12-3 (1981), available at http://cosmo.Pasadena.ca.us/ad-
ventures/atomic/bunker2.jpg.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
mission (SEC or Commission) undertook with the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 3 Sarbanes-Oxley does not vest the SEC with the
authority to regulate the attorney-client relationship in general. In-
stead, Section 307 of the Act directs the SEC to craft rules governing
an extraordinary event: discovery by a lawyer of credible evidence of a
material violation of law by the issuer or its directors, officers or em-
ployees. The Commission crafted rules that prescribe an "up-the-lad-
der" reporting regimen, placing the public company or issuer's
General Counsel or Chief Legal Officer at the epicenter.4
An in-house lawyer with such responsibility does not have the lux-
ury of debating either the merits of federalizing attorney-conduct reg-
ulation or the SEC's authority to mandate a lawyer's "noisy
withdrawal." The SEC's rules are in effect. Therefore, it is important
to understand their genesis, content, and effect on corporate law. For
in-house counsel, the fundamental challenge is deciding how to adjust
practices to the new rules.
I
THE GENESIS OF THE SARBANEs-OxLEY LAWYER RULES
The advocates who championed an SEC-mandated up-the-ladder
reporting requirement articulated a core principle in support of the
rule: when a public company lawyer becomes aware that the company
or its agents have materially violated the law, it is that lawyer's duty to
advise his client of this information. The rules governing lawyers typi-
cally did not compel a particular course of action; Section 307 was
adopted to fill that perceived void.
After the collapse of Enron Corporation and other corporate
scandals, there has been a particular analytic focus on the role of the
"gatekeepers" associated with public companies. 5 As the public scruti-
nized the performance of independent auditors, securities analysts,
rating agencies and the financial press, it was inevitable that the role
of lawyers would garner attention. 6
3 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15,
18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act].
4 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003).
5 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History
of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 269, 271 (2004) ("Above all, the fundamental develop-
ments that destabilized our contemporary corporate governance system were those ones
that changed the incentives confronting both senior executives and the corporation's
outside gatekeepers.").
6 See, e.g., Mike France, What About the Lawyers?, Bus. WK., Dec. 23, 2002, at 58, 58
("The lawyers not only drafted the documents that brought [Enron's] deals to life but also
wrote opinion letters that vouched for the legality of the company's acrobatic maneu-
vers."); see also Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC,
103 COLUM. L. REv. 1236, 1239 (2003) ("We lawyers are guilty. To commit most complex
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The up-the-ladder reporting concept was advanced in a March 7,
2002 letter from a group of forty law professors sent to SEC Chairman
Harvey Pitt.7 They noted that Model Rule 1.13 of the American Bar
Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires a
lawyer representing an organization to act in the best interest of that
organization. The letter added that Rule 1.13 suggests a number of
ways in which a lawyer could respond if the organization acts illegally:
report to management, report to the board of directors, or resign.
Despite these alternatives, "[n]owhere . . . does Model Rule 1.13 re-
quire a lawyer to take a specific course of action."8 The letter sug-
gested that the foundation to require such a report exists in SEC Rule
102(e), which authorizes the SEC to suspend from practice before the
Commission any attorney or other professional who violates the secur-
ities laws, assists another in the violation of the securities laws, "or oth-
erwise engages in unprofessional conduct." Specifically, the letter
recommended that a Commission rule should "expressly require a
lawyer who represents a corporation in connection with its securities
compliance to inform the client's board of directors if the lawyer
knows that the client is violating the securities laws and senior man-
agement does not promptly rectify the violation."9
In response, SEC General Counsel David Becker noted that it
may be reasonable to prefer one uniform rule of conduct governing
lawyers whose securities practice is national.10 Mr. Becker's letter also
stated that the SEC had not utilized Rule 102(e) for proceedings
against lawyers based on allegations of improper professional conduct
or to set rules regarding the professional responsibilities in the legal
profession. He summarized the prevailing view "that these matters are
more appropriately addressed by state bar rules, which historically
have been the source of professional responsibility requirements for
lawyers, and have been overseen by state courts." 1 The letter con-
cluded that there were "good reasons why consideration of such a sig-
nificant change in established practice should be undertaken in the
context of Congressional legislation, as opposed to agency
rulemaking."' 2
corporate frauds, companies need legal help. The trick is to make everything look legiti-
mate, and lawyers are critical to that task.").
7 Letter from Professor Richard W. Painter, University of Illinois, et al. to Harvey Pitt,
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 7, 2002), available at http://www.
abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/pitt.pdf.
8 Id. at 1.
9 Id. at2.
10 Letter from David Becker, General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission
to Professor Richard W. Painter, University of Illinois (Mar. 28, 2002), available at http://
www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/becker.pdf.
11 Id.
12 Id.
2004] 513
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:511
That federal legislation followed four months later in the form of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 13 Patched together in a frenetic flurry of leg-
islative activity, Section 307 of the Act mandates that the SEC adopt
rules "requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation
of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof).' 4 In
the absence of an appropriate response, Section 307 also requires
rulemaking that would mandate a report to the issuer's board of
directors. 15
The scant legislative history of Section 307 consists almost entirely
of the floor statements made by the provision's legislative sponsors.
The statements contain three principal themes. First, the sponsors
stressed that lawyers assume a ubiquitous presence in the modern cor-
porate world. "The truth is that executives and accountants do not
work alone," stated Senator John Edwards. "Anybody who works in
corporate America knows that whenever you see corporate executives
and accountants working, lawyers are virtually always there looking
over their shoulder."1 6 That access, the sponsors argued, provides
counsel with the opportunity to prevent misconduct. Indeed, Senator
Jon Corzine emphasized that "we cannot overlook the role corporate
13 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
14 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245(1) (2003). The language of this section is terse. The full text
follows:
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ATTORNEYS.
Not later than 180 days afterJuly 30, 2002, the Commission shall issue rules,
in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth mini-
mum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and prac-
ticing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers,
including a rule -
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of secur-
ities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or
any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of
the company (or the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with
respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to
the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another
committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not em-
ployed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
Id. § 7245.
15 Id.
16 148 CONG. REc. S6551 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) [hereinafter Sponsors 1]; see also id. at
S6556 (statement of Sen. Corzine):
In fact, in our corporate world today-and I can verify this by my own ex-
periences-executives and accountants work day to day with lawyers. They
give them advice on almost each and every transaction. That means when
executives and accountants have been engaged in wrongdoing, there have
been some other folks at the scene of the crime-and generally they are
lawyers.
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lawyers, the lowest common denominator, can play in addressing
abuses and ensuring that our markets have integrity."
1 7
Second, in supporting the amendment that ultimately became
Section 307, the sponsors emphasized that it merely requires corpo-
rate lawyers to report to the corporate entity that is their client. Sena-
tor Edwards argued that some corporate lawyers had forgotten the
identity of their clients:
[T]hey decide they are working for the chief executive officer or
the chief operating officer who hired them. They get to thinking
that playing squash with the CEO every week is more important
than keeping faith with the shareholders every day. So the lawyers
may not do their duty and say to their pal, the CEO, "No, you can-
not break the law."1 8
Finally, the sponsors underscored the fact that Section 307 was
crafted precisely to limit the scope of the reporting requirement. For
example, Senator Edwards stated that the duty to report "applies only
to evidence of a material violation of the law ... mean[ing that] no
reporting is required for piddling violations or violations that don't
amount to anything."1 9 In the same vein, Senator Michael Enzi dis-
missed as "ludicrous" any concerns that Section 307 could cause a
breach of the attorney-client privilege: "By reporting a legal violation
to management and then the board of directors, no breach of privi-
lege occurs, because it is all internal-within the corporation and not
to an outside party, such as the SEC."'20
II
THE SEC's PART 205 RULES
In early 2003, the Commission adopted rules to implement Sec-
tion 307's requirements.2 1 The rulemaking was highly anticipated be-
cause the 172 words of Section 307 (and its limited legislative history)
provided little direct guidance on the reach of the Section 307 re-
quirements. Specifically, the Commission's release delineated (a) the
universe of lawyers subject to the rule; (b) the obligation of these law-
yers to report, initially, violations to an issuer's management; (c) the
subsequent obligation to report to the board of directors; and (d) the
recourse of these lawyers after exhausting these requirements. 2 2
17 Id. at S6556.
18 Id. at S6552.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 6555.
21 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R.
§ 205 (2003).
22 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act
Release No. 33-8185 (Jan. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Adopting Release].
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A. Lawyers Subject to the Rules
The up-the-ladder reporting obligation under the new rules is
limited to attorneys "appearing and practicing before the Commis-
sion. '23 For purposes of the Part 205 rules, lawyers "practice" before
the Commission if they
* transact "any business with the Commission," including contact
with the Commission in any form;
* represent an issuer in an SEC administrative proceeding, investi-
gation, inquiry, information request or subpoena;
* provide U.S. securities law advice in connection with any docu-
ment that the attorney "has notice that will be filed with or sub-
mitted to" the Commission; or
* advise an issuer "whether information or a statement, opinion or
other writing is required" under the federal securities laws. 2 4
The Commission's Adopting Release explained that this broad defini-
tion was necessary "to reflect the reality that materials filed with the
Commission frequently contain information contributed, edited or
prepared by individuals who are not necessarily responsible for the
actual filing of the materials .... "25 The SEC noted a warning from
fifty academics that excluding from the definition lawyers who draft
documents or provide disclosure would "facilitate circumvention of
these rules .... [and] risk gutting these rules and [Section] 307."26
At the same time, the Commission relented to a vigorous lobby-
ing effort and excluded most foreign lawyers from the rules. The
rules expressly exclude "non-appearing foreign attorneys,"2 7 who are
defined as attorneys who (a) are admitted to practice in a jurisdiction
outside the United States; (b) do not hold themselves out as practic-
ing U.S. securities laws; and (c) conduct "activities that would consti-
tute appearing before the Commission only incidentally" to the
practice of law outside the United States (or, alternatively, appear and
practice before the Commission only in consultation with counsel ad-
mitted to practice in the United States). 28 However, the Commis-
sion's release cautioned that foreign attorneys who, for example,
independently counsel issuers regarding the application of SEC rules
to a periodic report filed with the Commission would be subject to the
rules.29
23 17 C.F.R. § 205.1.
24 Id. § 205.2(a)(i)-(iv).
25 Adopting Release, supra note 22.
26 Id. (quoting comments of Susan P. Koniak et al.)
27 17 C.F.R. § 295.2(ii) (specifically excluding nonappearing foreign attorneys from
coverage).
28 Id. § 205.20).
29 Adopting Release, supra note 22.
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B. "Credible Evidence of a Material Violation"
For lawyers subject to Part 205, their obligations are triggered
when they receive credible evidence of a "material violation" of law
"by the issuer or any officer, director, employee or agent of the is-
suer."30 The triggering standard set by the rule is
credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable,
under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not
to conclude that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing or is
about to occur.31
Linguistic gymnastics aside, two aspects of the definitions-related
definitions and the Commission's guidance-are important for any
lawyer who is required to apply the standard.
First, the universe of relevant violations is not limited to the fed-
eral securities laws. A "material violation" includes a material breach
of federal or state securities laws, "a material breach of fiduciary duty
arising under United States federal or state law, or a similar violation
of any United States federal or state law."'32 A breach of fiduciary duty
is further defined to include "any breach of fiduciary or similar duty to
the issuer recognized under an applicable Federal or State statute or at
common law, including but not limited to misfeasance, nonfeasance,
abdication of duty, abuse of trust, and approval of unlawful transac-
tions."33 The Commission expanded the definition in order to cap-
ture fiduciary standards articulated in federal statutes. 34 The breadth
of this standard is considerable; indeed, the federal securities laws
alone have been interpreted to capture a broad cross-section of
misdeeds. 35
Second, the rule is intended to set meaningful credibility and ma-
teriality thresholds. For example, the evidence must be sufficiently
credible to indicate that a material violation is likely to occur or has
occurred. The Adopting Release also emphasized that "an attorney is
not required (or expected) to report 'gossip, hearsay [or] innu-
endo.'"6 Similarly, the release noted that, by requiring only the re-
porting of a "material" violation, the Commission was adopting a
"term [with] well-established meaning"-information sufficiently im-
30 17 C.F.R § 205.3(b).
31 Id. § 201.205.2(e).
32 Id. § 205.2(i).
33 Id. § 205.2(d) (emphasis added).
34 Adopting Release, supra note 22.
35 For example, the law of insider trading has been developed in the absence of a
statutory or regulatory definition of the offense. Judicial interpretations of general an-
tifraud provisions of the federal securities laws have largely defined the violation instead.
See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-66 (1997).
36 Adopting Release, supra note 22.
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portant that any reasonable shareholder would want the information
in deciding whether to purchase, sell, or vote the issuer's securities. 3 7
C. The Reporting Requirement
A lawyer's receipt of credible evidence of a material violation trig-
gers a two-step process under the Part 205 rules.
1. Step One: Report to Management
First, the attorney possessing credible evidence of a potential ma-
terial violation must report this evidence "to the issuer's chief legal
officer or to both the chief legal officer and its chief executive of-
ficer. ' 38 Chief legal officers, in turn, are obligated to investigate
whether, in fact, a material violation has occurred. 39 Upon comple-
tion of the chief legal officer's investigation, the rules contemplate
two possibilities. If the chief legal officer determines that no material
violation has occurred, he is required to notify the reporting attorney
and outline the basis for the determination. 40 Otherwise, the chief
legal officer must take the necessary steps to have the issuer adopt an
"appropriate response," advising the reporting attorney of that re-
sponse. 4 1 An "appropriate response" is a response that leads the re-
porting attorney to reasonably believe that
" "no material violation [of law] has occurred, is ongoing or is
about to occur";
* the issuer has adopted "appropriate remedial measures" that
could include steps to stop or prevent material violations or to
remedy any violation that has occurred; or
* the issuer, with the consent of the issuer's board of directors or a
board committee, has retained counsel to investigate the report
and has either (a) "substantially implemented any remedial rec-
ommendations" made "after a reasonable investigation and eval-
uation of the reported evidence[,]" or (b) has been advised of
counsel's good faith belief that the issuer or the officer, director,
employee or agent involved has a "colorable defense" to assert.42
If the reporting attorney "receives what he or she believes to be an
appropriate and timely response," then that attorney has no further
obligations under the Part 205 rules. 43
37 Id.; see, e.g., TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("An omitted
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote.").
38 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(7).
-19 Id. § 205.3(b) (2).
40 Id.
41 Id. § 205.3(b).
42 Id.
43 Id. § 205.3(b) (8).
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2. Step Two: Report to the Board
The second step is triggered when the reporting attorney believes
that the issuer's senior management has failed to provide an appropri-
ate response within a reasonable period of time.4 4 At that point, the
reporting attorney is required to report the evidence of the material
violation to (1) "the audit committee of the issuei's board of direc-
tors"; or, if the board has no audit committee, then (2) another com-
mittee comprised of directors who are not employed by the issuer; or
(3) the issuer's board of directors. 4 5 The rules also provide that a
reporting lawyer may report evidence of a material violation to the
board if the reporting attorney reasonably believes that it would be
futile to report the evidence to the chief legal officer or the chief ex-
ecutive officer.46 A reporting attorney who believes that an appropri-
ate response has not been provided "shall explain his or her reasons"
to the chief legal officer, chief executive officer, or the board.47
This last situation gives rise to one of the most contentious issues
associated with Section 307: the course to be followed when the re-
porting attorney does not receive an appropriate response following
disclosure to the board or a board committee. As adopted, Part 205
rules permit disclosure of confidential information to the SEC without
the issuer's consent under limited circumstances:
* "[t]o prevent the issuer from committing a material violation
that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of the issuer or investors";
* "[t]o prevent the issuer.., from committing .. .or suborning
perjury" or illegal false statements in connection with an SEC
investigation or administrative proceeding; or
* "[t]o rectify the consequences of a material violation by the is-
suer that caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of the issuer or investors" when that material
violation was effected through the use of the attorney's
services. 48
The Commission does not, however, require that a reporting attorney
take any of these steps. In the event that an attorney does elect to
make a disclosure, Part 205 provides that no inconsistent state stan-
dard may subject an attorney to liability when he has complied in
good faith with these requirements. 49
44 Id. § 205.3(b).
45 Id. § 205.3(b) (3).
46 Id. § 205.3(b) (4).
47 Id. § 205.3(b) (9).
48 Id. § 205.3(d) (2).
49 Id. § 205.6(c).
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When the Commission adopted Part 205, it also extended com-
ment on another, more controversial requirement. Specifically, it
sought reaction to a "noisy withdrawal" rule that, when an issuer's
board failed to provide an "appropriate response," would require the
reporting attorney to
" withdraw from representation of the issuer, indicating that the
withdrawal was based on professional considerations;
* provide written notice to the SEC of the withdrawal within one
business day indicating that the withdrawal was based on profes-
sional considerations; and
* promptly disaffirm to the Commission any document or repre-
sentation filed with or made to the SEC by the reporting attor-
ney that the attorney believed to be materially false and
misleading. 50
The proposal sparked a flood of adverse commentary questioning the
SEC's authority to promulgate such a rule, the inconsistency of the
proposal with state ethics rules requiring lawyers to maintain client
confidences, and whether the specter of a noisy withdrawal, even if
remote, would chill issuer/attorney contacts on the difficult questions
that most acutely require the assistance of counsel. As the Commis-
sion adopted the Part 205 rules, the SEC proposed an alternative to
the noisy withdrawal provision: a requirement that the issuer disclose
publicly (on a Form 8-K) the resignation of counsel for professional
considerations much like issuers presently must disclose the resigna-
tion of their independent auditors. 51
III.
HAS ANYTHING REALLY CHANGED?
A corporate general counsel returning from a yearlong sabbatical
in January 2003 might wonder why the Part 205 rules generated so
much flotsam. In many respects, the new rules mandate precisely the
conduct that most in-house counsel already expect from both peers
and outside counsel. In its adopting release, the Commission empha-
sized that most of its requirements were consistent with the standards
to which many lawyers are subject already. Specifically, the SEC noted
that the "vast majority" ofjurisdictions permit or require disclosure of
ongoing illegal conduct.5 2 Given these facts, the key question for an
issuer's in-house counsel is whether the Part 205 rules will affect their
lives on a day-to-day basis. Two predictions inform that analysis.
50 Proposed Rule, Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attor-
neys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8150 (Nov. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Proposed Rule].
51 Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attor-
neys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8186 Uan. 29, 2003).
52 Adopting Release, supra note 22, at 32-33.
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CLIMBING "UP THE LADDER"
First, there is reason to believe that the number of reports under
the new rules will be modest. The structure of the rule requires credi-
ble evidence of a material violation. Few lawyers will uncover evidence
of illegal conduct that is material to the issuer.
Further, the historical precedent with the most analogous provi-
sion of the federal securities laws-Section 10A of the Securities Ex-
change Act 53-supports a prediction that there will be few reports.
Section 10A imposes upon auditors an obligation to report "illegal
acts," whether material or not, discovered over the course of an audit.54
Like Part 205, Section 10A requires reports in stages: First, auditors
must direct their reports to the appropriate level of management.55
Then, in the absence of appropriate remedial action, they must go to
the board of directors. 56 At that point, the auditors must tell the
board if "the illegal act has a material effect on the financial state-
ments of the issuer," and if the company's "failure to take remedial
action is reasonably expected to warrant departure from the standard
report of the auditor or warrant resignation [of the firm] from the
audit engagement." 57 The board is then required to provide the SEC
with a copy of the audit firm's report within one business day.58 If the
board fails to do so, the accounting firm must resign from the engage-
ment with the issuer and must furnish the SEC with a copy of the
report.5
9
Over nearly eight years, Section 10A reports have been relatively
rare. The General Accounting Office recently reported that from Jan-
uary 1, 1996 through May 15, 2003, the SEC received only twenty-nine
reports under Section 10A. 60 While the Commission has brought en-
forcement actions addressing auditor failures to issue Section 10A re-
ports, 61 that approach itself suggests that Section 10A reports remain
extraordinary events. There is no question that Section 10A arose in
an entirely different legislative context from Section 307 of the
53 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2003).
54 Id. § 78j-1(b)(1).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. § 78j-l(b)(2)(A) (2003).
58 Id. § 78j-1 (b) (3).
59 Id.
60 See Letter from Jeanette M. Franzel, Director, Financial Management and Assur-
ance, General Accounting Office to Rep. John D. Dingell 1 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.house.gov/commercedemocrats/press/gao92303.pdf.
61 See, e.g., Compl. at 11 121-25, SEC v. Chancellor Corp. (D.Mass. 2003), available at
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/compl8lO4.htm (alleging Section 10A violations by
audit firm and audit engagement partner for failure to report violations to issuer's manage-
ment or its board of directors); Compl., 1 145-48, SEC v. KPMG LLP, 2003 WAIL 21998052
(C. A. No. 03-CV-0671) (S.D.N.Y. 2003), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/
comp17954.htm (alleging Section 10A violations by auditors to Xerox Corporation for
their failure to report violators for the years 1997-2000).
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Nonetheless, nearly a decade of experience
under Section 10A suggests that, under the Part 205 rules, reports,
too, will be infrequent happenings.
Second, even if reports under the Part 205 rules are unusual, the
existence of these rules will increase significantly the opportunities for
the Commission and its enforcement staff to second-guess judgments
made by counsel when issuers or their agents violate the federal secur-
ities laws. These new high-profile rules must be viewed in the context
of the Commission's existing enforcement program. During the 2002
fiscal year, the SEC initiated a record 598 enforcement actions. 62 In
many of these actions, the Commission's staff developed a compre-
hensive evidentiary record regarding law violations by issuers and
their directors, officers, and employees. Now, in addition to assessing
whether the lawyers involved with these issues themselves violated the
law, the Commission's staff will weigh whether the lawyers reported
the violators in compliance with the Part 205 rules. While state ethical
rules may have imposed comparable requirements, there is little to
suggest that state disciplinary boards were compiling hundreds of in-
vestigative files that highlighted these issues each year. The SEC en-
forcement program creates such investigative files; the Part 205 rules
will invite an assessment of lawyers with the benefit of perfect
hindsight.
IV
THE PRAGMATIC RESPONSE
Placed at the epicenter of the Part 205 rules, corporate counsel
now face the immediate question of how to proceed in response to
the new requirements. No one formula is right for all issuers, but at
least three considerations will be relevant to most.
A. General Reporting Requirement
First, as a matter of corporate policy, an issuer's General Counsel
should apply a reporting requirement to all internal and external
counsel for the company. Regardless of how the Part 205 rules apply
to various counsel serving the company, there should be a single oper-
ating assumption that any material violation will be reported to the
General Counsel. Even in the absence of any SEC reporting require-
ment, the General Counsel has a strong business interest in being ap-
prised of potentially material legal concerns.
While this point may seem elementary, there is merit in making
this the first principle of any public company policy developed to ad-
dress the new up-the-ladder reporting requirements. Considerable
62 2002 SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N ANN. REP. 2.
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debate has been devoted to delineating the class of lawyers covered by
the Commission's rules. As discussed above, foreign lawyers lobbied
effectively to be excluded from the reach of these rules. Similarly,
lawyers with an expertise outside any aspect of the federal securities
laws may argue logically that they are incapable of practicing and ap-
pearing before the SEC. Such discussions are necessary for the
rulemaking exercise. For an issuer's General Counsel, they are less
important; corporate General Counsel have the same interest in get-
ting notice of an improper payment to a foreign government official
or a senior employee of the Food and Drug Administration as they do
in learning about notice expressly mandated by the Part 205 rules.
While in principle a policy should not be necessary to ensure that
material violations are reported to the General Counsel, the flow of
legal engagements may test that principle. For example, it is not un-
common to vest business managers with discretion regarding the re-
tention of outside counsel. Counsel who have had little or no contact
with an issuer's General Counsel might not place the first call to that
lawyer when confronted with potentially illegal conduct. The adop-
tion of the Part 205 rules make it prudent to ensure that all lawyers
serving the issuer understand that they must inform the General
Counsel promptly of any material violation.
B. Reporting Structure
Second, the reporting structure typically should begin with the
corporate General Counsel. This discussion puts aside discussions re-
garding those limited situations in which the allegation relates to the
conduct of the General Counsel. In most instances, there will be a
premium on the efficiency that the General Counsel can provide in
screening the reports and supporting any investigation that follows.
The question of reporting structure merits separate discussion be-
cause current efforts at corporate reform generally place a dispropor-
tionate burden on independent directors. In the up-the-ladder rules,
this tendency personifies itself in rules relating to "Qualified Legal
Compliance Committees" (QLCC). The QLCC is defined as a com-
mittee that consists of "at least one member of the issuer's audit com-
mittee" (or equivalent committee in the absence of an audit
committee) and "two or more members of the board of directors who
are not employed by the issuer."63 An existing committee, such as the
audit committee, may serve as the QLCC. In whatever form, the rules
require the QLCC to adopt written procedures for the "confidential
63 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(1) (2003).
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receipt, retention and consideration of any report of evidence of a
material violation .... -64
If an issuer's board has created a QLCC, the Part 205 rules create
an alternative track for reporting credible evidence of a material viola-
tion. Specifically, the rules provide that rather than contacting man-
agement, the reporting attorney may report to a QLCC, if such a
committee has been formed. Referring the matter directly to a QLCC
allows a reporting attorney to satisfy his reporting obligations (and, as
a result, the reporting attorney is freed from any obligation to assess
the issuer's response) .65 The issuer's chief legal officer also may elect
to refer evidence to an established QLCC, advising the reporting at-
torney that the QLCC will assume responsibility for responding to the
report.6 6
The QLCC option creates an incentive to "kick the question up-
stairs." That incentive should be complemented by an assumption
that, in most instances, the General Counsel will take the lead in as-
sessing reports of material violations. As the lawyer most familiar with
an issuer's business, organization, individuals, and quirks, the General
Counsel is most capable of facilitating an efficient and effective re-
sponse to reported material violations. As a preliminary matter, in-
house counsel can offer an assessment regarding the purported viola-
tion and the credibility of the evidence. Beyond that, the General
Counsel can enhance the efficiency of the investigation by identifying
sources of information, documents, and the relevant participants.
Even when independent counsel has been retained, the General
Counsel and other in-house counsel may provide important informa-
tion for the review.
Efficiency may be critical because the mere existence of a un-
resolved report under 205 may impair the company's capacity to re-
port results through its periodic filings with the SEC. Recent
rulemaking has shortened the reporting deadlines for an issuer's
quarterly and annual reports and requires the Chief Executive Officer
and Chief Financial Officer to certify the completeness and accuracy
of periodic reports filed with the SEC. 6 7 In the absence of a prompt
resolution, the report of a material violation could effectively delay
64 See id. § 205.2(k)(2).
65 Id.§ 201.205.3(c) (1).
66 Id. § 205.3(c) (2).
67 See Final Rule, Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclosure Con-
cerning Website Access to Reports, Securities Act Release No. 33-8128 (Sept. 5, 2002)
(adopting gradual timetable to reduce deadlines for many issuer annual reports from
ninety to sixty days); Final Rule, Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and
Annual Reports, Securities Act Release No. 33-8124 (Aug. 28, 2002) (adopting rules requir-
ing issuer principal executive and financial officers to certify financial and other informa-
tion in periodic reports filed with the SEC).
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the issuer's next periodic report, possibly diminishing the company's
market capitalization and endangering the issuer's exchange listing.
Such repercussions may be necessary but bitter medicine if, for exam-
ple, the issuer confronts significant unresolved accounting issues.
Conversely, it would be a tremendous waste for all involved if the re-
porting cycle was delayed because a baseless allegation could not be
resolved in a timely manner. While the General Counsel's participa-
tion cannot guarantee against those results, it may minimize the risk
that an immaterial issue produces dramatically adverse results.
C. A Predetermined Game Plan for Directors
Third, each issuer's board of directors should consider, in ad-
vance, how they will address any reports mandated by Part 205. For
corporate boards, Section 307 and the Part 205 rules represent a de-
parture from the norm in one respect: they provide a fairly precise
prescription for the actions required of the board and management
when counsel discovers potential material violations of law. Each
board should develop a game plan for the receipt of such reports, be
it a QLCC, the audit committee or an individual director designated
to serve as the board's "point person" in monitoring management's
response.
The content of the board's policy may be less important than en-
suring its placement in the broader context of the board's oversight of
the issuer's legal compliance efforts. The Part 205 rules relate to an
extraordinary event. More routine, but equally important, is the
board's ongoing oversight of company's legal compliance efforts. 68 In
the normal course, boards monitor management's effort to identify,
monitor, and address the company's principal legal risks. Responding
appropriately to reports of material violations is an important part of
that oversight, but only a part.
CONCLUSION
The SEC's Part 205 rules effectively require in-house counsel to
construct a blast shelter for their companies, a set of practices to re-
spond to extraordinary reports of material violations of law. This mer-
68 Both the Delaware courts and the SEC had emphasized the oversight obligations of
directors well before Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley became part of the corporate governance
lexicon. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (dis-
cussing the responsibility of directors to inform themselves and monitor the operations of
the company's compliance efforts); Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Concerning the Conduct of Certain Former Officers
and Directors of W.R. Grace & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 39157 (Sept. 30,
1997) (issuing report of investigation to "emphasize the affirmative responsibilities of cor-
porate officers and directors to ensure that the shareholders whom they serve receive accu-
rate and complete disclosure of information").
2004]
526 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:511
its attention from a company-specific perspective. Even if the reports
are rare and the possibility seems remote, the mere existence of the
rules makes it prudent to have practices in place.
Implementing a policy to address Part 205 rules is not the real
challenge. In-house lawyers arguably add the most value when they
are embedded in the organization and, through that proximity, help
manage risks and exercise judgment when it matters most. Immeasur-
able harm to the company's franchise and tremendous cost may be
avoided when a prescient counsel avoids a protracted dispute, resolves
an employment situation, or presses the issuer to make a prudent but
unpopular disclosure. Companies must find a way to create the struc-
ture that Sarbanes-Oxley requires while preserving the in-house coun-
sel's role as a bulwark and a resource in a hostile public company
environment.
